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1. INTRODUCTION 
As a concept social security has its roots in western society. In contempo-
rary western societies it is common to indicate with social security the 
protection provided by (mainly) state institutions for individuals or social 
groups against the loss of earnings, which result from so called social risks 
(for example, old age, sickness, maternity, unemployment). Four major 
elements of this protection are income-tested social assistance, social 
insurance, categorical transfers, and health care (Atkinson 1988:100-123). 
Studies of social security in western societies focus on the implementation 
of these forms of protection, and their effects on socio-economic proces-
ses and relationships. 
By interpreting the concept social security as described above, one could 
easily suggest that social security is a particular feature of the western 
society only. A study of, for example, social security in a developing 
country, would reveal that almost no social security exist in the sense 
described above. Anthropological studies, however, have made clear that 
also in non-western societies mechanisms exist to protect individuals or 
social groups against social risks. However, with our narrow interpretation 
of social security we would not label these mechanisms as social security. 
In order to make the study of social security in developing countries 
possible, we have to adapt our ideas on what social security exactly is and 
to change our analytical framework accordingly. The analytical framework 
has to be less specific, i.e., less oriented on western societies. 
This paper discusses the concept of social security itself and important 
related issues. In Section 2 the definition problem of social security is 
discussed. A less western oriented definition is presented, which might 
facilitate the study of social security in developing countries. Section 3 
justifies this wider definition by arguing that social security can be consi-
dered as a universal necessity, and as a phenomenon is not restricted to 
westera societies. Section 4 discusses important related issues like "forms" 
and "principles" of social security, methods underlying social security 
systems and the main determinants of social security systems. 
It is not the objective of this paper to present the definition of social 
security or the theory of social security. The main objective is to discuss 
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and place the concept of social security and related issues in a more 
general context, which would facilitate, then, the analysis of social security 
in developing countries. 
2. THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
The term "social security" has its origin in the welfare policy of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930's. In 1934 Roosevelt announced a 
program for "security against the hazards and vicissitudes of life" (Partsch 
1985:14). In 1935 this announcement was foliowed by the "Social Security 
Act".1 In 1948 social security was officially proclaimed a human right in 
Article 22 of the General Declaration of Human Rights of the United 
Nations. In 1952 the International Labour Office (ILO) introduced an 
ultimate definition of social security in Convention 102. Nowadays social 
security is a major component of welfare policies of all industrialized 
countries. 
Studies on social security in developing countries (e.g., Fuchs 1983; Mesa-
Lago 1978; Mouton 1975) have frequently used the ILO definition of 
social security. But it became clear that this definition has some limita-
tions when it is applied to the analysis of social security in developing 
countries. Nevertheless, the ILO definition will be the point of departure 
in Section 2.1., in which the ILO definition and its shortcomings with 
respect to developing countries are analyzed. Section 2.2. discusses the 
formulation of an alternative definition, which is thought to be more 
useful when analyzing social security in developing countries. 
1
 The title of the Social Security Act gives an indication of what was 
already understood under social security: "An Act to provide for the 
general welfare by establishing a system of federal old age benefits, and 
by enabling the several states to make more adequate provision for aged 
persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and 
child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment 
compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; 
and for other purposes" (quotation from Partsch 1983:15, footnote 10). 
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2.1. The ILO definition of social security 
In 1952 the International Labour Office defined in Convention 102 social 
security as: 
"the protection which society provides for its members, through a 
series of public measures, against the economie and social distress 
that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial 
reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, matemity, employment 
injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of 
medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with 
children." (ILO 1984:2-3) 
This definition has been used during the last decades by both policy 
makers and researchers dealing with social security in western societies. 
The last decade an increasing amount of studies of social security in 
developing countries is published. Not only social security systems based 
on western models were studied, but also other forms and mechanisms got 
increasing attention. 
With this studies became clear that the ILO definition was too limited to 
analyze non-western social security systems. Let us therefore discuss the 
major points from the ILO definition and relate these points to develop-
ing countries in order to highlight the main deficiënties of the definition. 
The ILO definition states that social security is a form of protection 
provided by "society... through... public measures". In literature on social 
security sometimes is argued (Woodman 1988), that this part of the 
definition might draw the attention to state institutions of social security 
only. In studies on social security "society" is often understood as "state" 
and in accordance with this "public measures" are synonymous to state 
laws. Woodman (1988:70) argues that this limitation reflects the tendency 
for political discussion in western societies to exalt the state. By interpret-
ing social security as a form of protection by the state or state-initiated 
organizations, several studies on social security in developing countries 
(e.g., Fuchs 1985; Mesa-Lago 1978; Mouton 1975) suggest that social 
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security is a scarce good to find in those societies. Fuchs (1985:35-7) 
estimates that 10 percent or less of the population in developing countries 
is covered by social security provided by the state. By giving such a 
limited interpretation of "society" and "public measures" in the ILO defim-
tion a whole range of mechanisms and forms of social security functioning 
at other levels (household, family, community, etc.) are overlooked. Most 
people in developing countries obtain their social security at these other 
levels. 
Although some studies suggest that the ILO definition itself attracts atten-
tion to state-organized forms of social security we think this is rather an 
interpretation of the authors themselves. The reference in the ILO 
definition to society and public measures is not a deficiency. "Society" can 
easily be understood as a constellation of families, kingroups, clans, 
villages, and a state; and although "public" in economie analysis is part of 
the public-private dichotomy in which "public" often stands for state 
organized or state initialized, "public" can also be interpreted as "public 
action" (see, for example, Drèze and Sen 1991), which can be found at all 
levels of society. Until sofar the definition of the ILO does not seem to 
limit the study of social security in developing countries. 
The ILO definition continues with the statement that social security 
protects against social and economie distress. What is "distress"? In 
industrialized countries it mostly indicates the exceptional situation of 
being in danger of falling below an acceptable and normal minimum level 
of social and economie well-being. The measure of this level is relative to 
the Standard achievable by many in society. In developing countries this 
level is usually very low, and "distress" must be understood then as 
"destitution", i.e., a condition below the Standard necessary for survival as 
a member of society (Woodman 1988:70). The point made here is that 
social and economie distress may have a different meaning in developed 
and developing countries. We will return to the valuation of distress in 
Section 2.2. 
The ILO definition also indicates that the major cause of social and 
economie distress is the loss of earnings as result of a core group of risks. 
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If we look at the loss of earnings two points can be made. At first sight 
earnings can be understood as monetary earnings. However, in developing 
countries far more people are dependent on activities which generate 
non-monetary earnings. All forms of income-producing activity are 
therefore in issue. It would be desirable to make this clearer in the defini-
tion. Secondly, social security only seems to apply to persons who suffer 
social and economie distress as result of losing earnings. It does not meet 
the case of a person who loses an "unearned" income, that is, an income 
not attributable to a continuing economie activity on their part. The 
definition ought to meet not only the cases of those who lose an income-
producing activity, but also of those who are unable to begin any (Wood-
man 1988:72). In these respects the ILO definition is clearly related to a 
particular socio-economic order, i.e., that order that is assumed to make 
provision for most members of society. In developing countries the 
existing social orders vary and are changing rapidly. Any reference to loss 
or lack of earnings might be better avoided, then. 
With respect to the causes of loss of earnings the ILO definition refers to 
a core group of risks. Certainly these risks can be found in all countries, 
but for developing countries other risks are equally important. Because of 
technological innovation and progress industrialized countries have largely 
been able to eliminate weather-induced and environmental risks, like 
drought, erosion, floods, etc. However, for people in developing countries 
these risks are a persistent danger for their earnings. It can be discussed if 
these kind of risks should not be included when looking at developing 
countries. It might even be better to avoid any reference to any risk, as 
this might differ with each society studied. We will also turn to this point 
in Section 2.2. 
A last remark is concerned with the last two phrases of the ILO defini-
tion, the provision of medical care and subsidies for families with 
children. Both seem to be in contradiction with the former phrases. In the 
first part of the definition protection only seems to apply to those who 
lost earnings, while the second part seems to apply to all people. Both the 
provision of medical care and of child maintenance are not limited to 
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families which are themselves at risk. Here the objective is different from 
the protection against distress. It is a social objective in which the ILO 
gestures towards the goal of equalisation of material conditions. 
In sum it can be concluded on the one hand that the ILO definition 
contains elements that are broad enough to cover the prevailing situation 
in developing countries. It is rather the interpretation of concepts like 
"society", "public", and "distress" by western scholars that restrict studies 
than the terms themselves, which can be considered broad enough. On the 
other hand the second part of the definition, which refers to loss of 
earnings, a core group of risks and the provision of medical and child 
care, contains some biased, and in the latter cases, some contradictory 
elements and reflect a particular socio-economic order. These underlying 
assumptions restrict the analysis of social security in developing countries, 
where other, sometimes rapidly changing, socio-economic orders are to be 
found, with different uncertainties and different priorities. 
A more general definition is needed, therefore, when studying social 
security in developing countries. This is discussed in the following section. 
2.2. An alternative definition of social security 
When studying social security in developing countries it is not so difficult 
to indicate the weak points of the ILO definition of social security. It is, 
however, far more difficult to find a good alternative which reflects both 
the situation in developing countries and at the same time is restrictive 
enough to define social security as a research object. 
From the previous section the conclusion may be drawn that the defini-
tion of social security in developing countries should be dissociated from 
any specific type of normative regulation or transfer of goods and services 
Von Benda-Beckmann (1988:10) suggests that we must use the term social 
security to indicate, perhaps illuminate, a field of social problems, rather 
than looking for clear boundaries of the concept. With social problems 
Von Benda-Beckmann means that people in developing countries suffer 
from insecurity, from uncertainties: whether or not they will have enough 
to eat tomorrow, have a roof above their head, be cared for when they 
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are ill, etc. In the most genera! sense, then, social security refers to "the 
efforts of individuals, kingroups, villages and state institutions to overcome 
these insecurities" (Von Benda-Beckmann 1988:10). 
According to Von Benda-Beckmann (1988:10) the term social security can 
thus be taken to refer to social phenomena on a variety of levels. On one 
level it indicates values, ideals, ideologies, and, in more concrete form, 
policy objectives. Different agents define social security differently. It does 
not make sense to take one such definition. One should rather investigate 
the different definitions and relate them to the problem of social security. 
The second level is the level of institutions. Also here we encounter great 
variety. In some societies (industrialized countries), specific institutions 
have been build to provide assistance to the needy, in other societies no 
specific social security institutions have been differentiated from social 
organization in general. We have to analyze these differences, explain 
them and indicate their significance. And at the third level, at the level of 
practical collective and individual action, social security colours the most 
varied sorts of social processes. Building a house, as category of behav-
iour, is not as such a form of social security provision, but building houses 
for the poor might be considered as such. 
The definition of Von Benda-Beckmann is wide but allows to distinguish 
more sharply the unknown areas and conceptualizations needed (Von 
Benda-Beckmann 1988:11). However, it is argued here that the definition 
is too wide to be of practical use when doing research on social security in 
developing countries. The danger might arise, because of very low stan-
dards of living in developing countries, that all institutions and mechan-
isms (differentiated or not from social organization), that all collective 
and individual action, can be interpreted as social security. In this sense, 
then, a study on social security leads to a study of society in all its facets 
and cannot be considered as a separate research object any more. 
In his theoretical study on pre-industrialized societies Partsch (1983:47) 
suggests that a definition of social security should stress the function of 
social security for individual and society. Although Partsch's study refers 
to western pre-industrialized societies (what he calls archaic and feudal 
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societies), his study gives a contribution that is important for the study of 
developing countries also, without adopting an evolutionistic approach. 
like most scholars Partsch rejects the definition of social security that 
refers to specific institutions or particular forms of action and risks as 
these are highly dependent on the society studied. Such a definition 
cannot be used to study social security in different societies and to 
compare different societies. 
Partsch argues that the function of social security can be derived from the 
term "social security" itself. The function of social security has apparently 
something to do with an "insurance function". What is the object of 
insurance, then? The answer is "the Standard of living" of individuals or 
social groups. The concept of Standard of living itself is a controversial 
one. If the object of insurance is the Standard of living, then the Standard 
of living must be operationalized or better still "valued". A thesis can be 
written on this subject. We have different priorities here, but will pay 
brief attention to this valuation problem. 
Drèze and Sen (1991:5-10) distinguish three valuation methods of Stan-
dard of living. The first approach is the utilitarian notion of value, derived 
from mainstream welfare economics. It sees value only in individual 
utility, itself defined in terms of some mental condition, such as pleasure, 
happiness, desire-fulfilment. This subjectivist perspective is, however, very 
misleading as it may fail to reflects a person's real deprivation. For 
example, in times of long-standing deprivation a person is not going to 
sigh all day and complain about his or her miserable situation. He or she 
will try to find pleasure in some small mercies. When a metric is used, 
then, like pleasure, someone's real deprivation may be concealed. 
The second approach concentrates on a person's real income or command 
over essential commodities. An example within this approach is the "basic 
needs approach", which concentrates on the requirement to provide some 
specified minimal amounts of necessary goods (such as food, clothing, 
shelter, etc). The disadvantage of this approach is that the ability to 
convert commodities into personal achievements may vary greatly between 
one person and another, and also between commumties. Focusing on 
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incomes for analyzing poverty and depnvation has the same problem of 
variability, because the value of income lies in its use for commanding 
commodities (Drèze and Sen 1991:6). Moreover, there is an additional 
problem of variability in the relationship between income and commod-
ities. Market limitations can cause variations in the power of income to 
establish command over goods and services (Drèze and Sen 1991:6). 
Therefore the problem of conversion of commodities into living standards 
is compounded by the problem of conversion of income into commodities. 
The third approach comes from Drèze and Sen themselves and they 
propose that the focus variable for analyzing quality of life in general or 
deprivation and poverty in particular, is the capability to perform certain 
basic functions. If life is seen as a set of doings and beings that are valu-
able, the exercise of assessing the quality of life takes the form of evaluat-
ing these functionings and the capability to function. The task is that of 
evaluation of the importance of the various functionings in human life. 
The functionings have to be examined, and the capability of the person to 
achieve them has to be appropriately valued (Drèze and Sen 1991:8). 
Drèze and Sen (1991:9) conclude that the ultimate analysis of quality of 
life in general or poverty in particular has to be with the deprivation of 
living conditions, for example, lack of nourishment (rather than of the 
income to buy nutrients), exposure to preventable diseases (rather than 
inability to buy medicine), and so on. Poverty or deprivation is the failure 
to have the ability to achieve minimal levels of certain basic functionings 
(such as being adequately nourished, minimally sheltered, and so on), and 
that failure would have to occupy the centre of the stage (Drèze and Sen 
1991:9). 
Returning now to our discussion of the function of social security, we can 
say that the security function of social security with respect to the Stan-
dard of living might be twofold: the first one is to prevent deterioration of 
the Standard of living, i.e., the protection of an individual against a 
decrease in nis or her abilities to achieve minimal levels of certain basic 
functionings. Moreover, a function of social security might be to increase 
someone's Standard of living, if a person's Standard of living is below a 
certain minimum Standard of living. In other words, social security can 
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also have the function to increase someone's abilities to achieve certain 
basic functionings. 
In the literature (Burgess and Stern 1991; Drèze and Sen 1991; Atkinson 
1989; Partsch 1983) this doublé function of social security with regard to 
the Standard of living is emphasized. It is important to distinguish these 
two functions, which can be labelled as "protection" and "promotion" 
(Drèze and Sen 1991:3). The protection function is concerned with 
preventing a decline in living standards in general and in the basic 
conditions of Hving in particular. This contrasts with the function of 
enhancing normal living conditions and dealing with regular and often 
persistent deprivation. This promotional aspect of social security is more 
ambitious in wanting to counter problems that have survived for thou-
sands of years. The implication of this twofold function is important for 
strategie issues. 
When we read the ILO definition of social security carefully the protec-
tion and promotion function can be found. The protection element can be 
found in the part of the definition where social and economie distress 
(i.e., fall of Standard of Hving) has to be avoided. A fall of a Standard of 
Hving (decline of capabilities to achieve certain basic functions) can occur 
by events like sickness, invalidity, unemployment, employment injury, 
sudden death of household member, and old age. The promotion element 
can be found in the provision of medical care and subsidies for families 
with children. This is promotion of the existing Standard of Hving as the 
capabilities of family members to achieve certain basic functionings are 
extended. 
When millions of people live in a continuing situation of severe depriva-
tion, i.e., a situation in which they do not have capabilities to achieve 
certain basic functionings, the promotional function of social security 
seems to be more important than the protection function, although the 
latter is not absent in situations of severe deprivation. Even when Hving in 
deprivation there might be some social security to prevent a situation in 
which people fall further and further as result of particular contingenties. 
When we speak of social security we have both protective and promo-
tional social security in mind. 
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If we would stop our discussion of the definition of social security, the 
definition would be as follows: social security is the protection against a 
fall in the Standard of living of individuals or social groups and/or the 
promotion of those standards of living of individuals and social groups, 
which are below a certain minimum level. 
This definition only highlights that social security "insures" the Standard of 
living by protection and promotion. The protection and promotion of 
standards of living can be reached, however, by all kinds of measures and 
strategies but also by general developments like climatic change and 
economie development. Moreover. also the individual him- or herself is 
sometimes able to protect or promote his or her own Standard of living. Is 
all this included then in the social security agenda? This is a rethoric 
question. 
By giving a meaning to "social" in the term "social security" and incorpor-
ating this meaning in the definition we might be able to limit the "actions" 
that fall under the umbrella of social security. 
"Social" is a term with a lot of meanings. It is common use to indicate 
with "social" an act or mentality that is directed to the well-being of one's 
fellow-men. According to Partsch (1983:49) the term "social" in social 
security originally may have had such a meaning. Social policy, of which 
social security is a part, originates from criticisms on the miserable 
conditions in which the industrial proletariat had to live during the last 
century (Partsch 1983:49). It is not very realistic to assume that this kind 
of behaviour is still meant with "social" when speaking about "social 
security". 
It is more likely that the meaning of social is in essence "societal" or "by 
society". As we saw in Section 2.1. the ILO also interpreted "social" to 
mean "by society"... "through a series of public measures". It was indicated 
that terms like "society" and "public measures" are often interpreted as 
"state" and "measures by the state" respectively. Analogous to the ILO we 
also indicate with "social" "by society", but here the term "society" is not 
applied to refer to state institutions only. We prefer to use the term in a 
much broader sense, indicating a constellation of families, kingroups, 
clans, villages, and a state. Apart from this, we think that a social security 
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definition for developing countries should not mention references to 
public or any other specific measures. Although specific social security 
measures do exist in developing countries, most people depend for their 
social security on social processes or institutions that cannot be differenti-
ated from social organization in general and, therefore, these processes 
and institutions cannot be labelled as explicit "social security measures". 
The implicit contribution, however, of these processes and institutions to 
the doublé function of social security (the protection and promotion of 
the standards of living of individuals or social groups) should make them 
part of social security analysis in developing countries. Therefore, it seems 
better to avoid any reference to specific measures in a social security 
definition for developing countries. 
In sum, we give the term "social" a broader meaning than the ILO did, 
but still our interpretation is somehow restrictive. First of all, it excludes 
measures at the individual level from being included in the analysis of 
social security. An individual might well be able to prevent him- or herself 
against a fall of the Standard of living by taking his or her own measures. 
By referring to society, measures at the individual level are excluded and 
do not fall under social security. Secondly, the restriction to society 
excludes a wide range of other factors (for example, technological innova-
tions, industrialization), which may contribute to the objective of social 
security, but cannot be considered as part of a social security agenda 
(Burgess and Stern 1991:43). 
Finally, it can be asked if a definition of social security should refer to 
specific contingencies. Previous critics indicate that the incorporation in 
the definition of specified contingencies is not desirable. The multitude of 
contingencies that are prevalent in developing countries will make it 
impossible to mention them all in a definition of social security. In fact all 
contingencies are under issue, as far as the contingency influences someo-
ne's Standard of living negatively and the individual is not able to cope 
with the consequences of a particular contingency him- or herself. It is 
proposed here to summarize contingencies under the head of "temporary 
adversities", which is considered broad enough to cover all kinds of 
contingencies. Moreover, in developing countries millions of people have 
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a very low Standard of living as result of persistent deprivation. This 
Standard of living is far below an acceptable minimum Standard of living 
and is mostly not the result of temporary adversities, but a consequence of 
long standing deprivation. 
All what is said in this section leads to a definition of social security that 
we want to present here: 
"social security is, firstly, the protection by society of individuals or 
social groups against a fall in their standards of living as result of 
temporary adversities and, secondly, the promotion by society of 
those standards of living of individuals or social groups which are 
below an acceptable minimum lever. 
The definition presented should not be considered as the one and only 
definition of social security. But when studying social security in develo-
ping countries this definition has some advantages over the ILO defini-
tion. Firstly, our definition stresses more clearly the doublé function of 
social security, i.e., the protection and the promotion of standards of 
living. Especially when studying developing countries with millions of 
people living below a subsistence minimum, this distinction can be import-
ant. Secondly, the definition does not mention a specific core of contin-
gencies. The occurrence of contingencies and their frequencies and 
impacts differ per society. Moreover, in each society views differ on what 
kind of contingencies should be covered by a social security program. 
Thirdly, the definition attaches less weight to the state as the sole pro-
vider of social security. In our view many institutions and social processes 
in society contribute implicitly or explicitly to the ultimate goal of social 
security and these can be found at all levels of society. 
In sum, in our opinion the presented definition is less oriented towards a 
specific socio-economic order. When applying this definition of social 
security it will be easier to analyze social security in developing countries. 
Of course, we acknowledge that definitions of social security contain many 
subjective elements and the remarks of Von Benda-Beckmann should be 
borae in mind. Different agents within a given society will define social 
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security differently according to. their own position in society. What 
ultimately in a given society is considered as social security or which 
contingencies should be covered by a social security program is mostly the 
outcome of a political process. The role of pressure groups, public action 
and political processes should, therefore, not be underestimated when 
studying social security in a given society (Drèze and Sen 1991; Mesa-
Lago 1978). 
3. SOCIAL SECURITY AS UNIVERSAL NECESSITY 
In Section 2 we concentrated on the definition problem of social security. 
We argued that most definitions used by scholars reflect the situation in 
industriahzed countries. Our definition is meant to be much broader and 
can be applied on developing countries too. However, by defining social 
security within a broader context, we assumed implicitly that social 
security can be found in all kind of societies. Recent studies (Ahmad et 
al. 1991; Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988; Bossert 1985; Partsch 1983) show 
that also in non-industrialized societies forms of social security exist, often 
different from those in the industriahzed societies.2 With Partsch (1983:-
54) we want to argue that social security can be found all over the world, 
because it is an universal necessity. It remains, however, difficult to prove 
this assumption inductively, because it is impossible to study all societies 
at all times. Moreover, one deviating case would force us to reject the 
assumption immediately. 
To make the assumption plausible Partsch (1983:54) suggests to follow the 
deductive route by formulating conditions that require the existence of 
some form of social security. If empirical research confirms these condi-
tions with an acceptable certainty, the universal necessity of social 
security can be derived from the ubiquitous existence of these conditions. 
Social security can be seen as an universal necessity if, firstly, all over the 
world, at all times, the Standard of living of people is threatened by risks 
2
 What exactly is understood in this paper with "forms of social secur-
ity" is explained in the next section. 
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or uncertainties, and secondly, all over the world, at all times, the possibil-
ities of people to protect themselves individually against the consequences 
of an actual occurrence of a risk or uncertainty are insufficiënt. 
For the first condition for social security to be an universal necessity, the 
universal vulnerability of people for risks, Partsch (1983:55-7) uses insights 
from "philosophical anthropology" to underpin this condition. In this view 
man is considered as a being of nature which is relatively vulnerable in 
comparison with other beings (like animals, plants, etc). The human 
being has less specialized organs than other beings and lack of protective 
institutions would make man relatively vulnerable then. Without any 
artificial means of help man would not have existed for a long time. But, 
as philosophical anthropology argues, because people were able to make 
instruments and tools to replace missing organs (technological progress) 
and because of the building of social and organizational institutions 
(social progress) the human being was able to change the natural environ-
ment into an artificial environment (culture) in which man is less vulner-
able and consequently viable. Notwithstanding this technological and 
social progress, mankind is still threatened by risks like sickness, death, 
etc. History shows that mankind has not been able to eliminate all risks 
from its environment. 
However, the universal threat of risks does not necessitate social security. 
It is the inadequacy of individual precautions that do necessitate social 
security. People are not able to bear all consequences of risks that 
endanger their Standard of living themselves. The validity of this condition 
can be proved when we ask ourselves what the conditions are that would 
enable a human being to protect him- or herself fully against risks. These 
conditions are threefold. 
Firstly, an individual must have command over commodities that he or 
she does not need for subsistence needs; this requires the production of a 
surplus. Secondly, an individual must have free command over this 
surplus, i.e., an individual is not forced to give the surplus to others (by 
tax levies, etc), there are no traditions or norms that restrict the use of 
the surplus, and the use of the surplus does not require the permission of 
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others. Thirdly, the means over which can be freely commanded must not 
lose their value or utility in time and must be at a person's disposal 
immediately. 
Besides, even when these conditions are fulfilled, the possibilities of 
individual precautions are limited by the fact that from an individual 
perspective it is not always possible to foresee if a risk actually will occur 
(for example, illness, accident), when it will occur (for example, death of 
family member) and how long the consequences of a risk occurrence will 
last. Only complete absence of uncertainty would remove these con-
straints. However, according to a common insurance principle, hundred 
percent certainty never exists. In order to make individual precautions 
sufficiënt to meet the consequences of the risk occurrence, then, these 
precautions should be based on the maximal possible harm that can occur, 
and not on a mean possibility. The higher the uncertainty about the risk 
occurrence, the moment of occurrence and the duration of the conse-
quences, the less appropriate and limited are individual precautions. 
It is obvious that the fore mentioned conditions to make individual 
precautions sufficiënt in case of risk occurrence are not fulfilled in real 
life. This implies that an individual cannot protect himself against all risks 
individually, and that it might also not be economically efficiënt for an 
individual to do so. 
In summary, the universal existence of risks threatening mankind, and the 
insufficiency of individual precautions to meet the consequences of these 
risks, seem to make social security an universal necessity. By answering 
the question why social security can be considered as an universal necess-
ity, we have justified the choice for a much broader definition of social 
security as presented in Section 2. 
The universal necessity of social security does not automatically imply, 
however, that social security is considered as desirable in any given society 
and that forms are developed that meet the objectives of social security. 
In other words, nothing is said thus far on the question whether or not it 
is possible in a given society to develop institutions, mechanisms, pro-
cesses, that meet the objectives of social security. Several conditions have 
to be fulfilled to make this possible, and the actual forms of social 
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security are influenced by several determinants. These conditions and 
determinants will be subject of discussion in the next section. 
4. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: METHODS, FORMS AND DETER-
MINANTS 
In previous sections we were concerned with the definition of social 
security and indicating its universal necessity. Defining social security and 
stating its universal necessity is one thing; the realization of social security 
is another one. The efforts that are taken to realize the objectives of 
social security can be referred to as "social security system". With Frei-
burg-Strauss and Jung (1988:229-230) we will use the term "social security 
system" to refer to all measures and strategies by society that, in their 
entirety, contribute to the objectives of social security, i.e., the protection 
of individuals or social groups against a fall in their Standard of living as 
result of temporary adversity and amelioration of low standards of living 
of individuals and social groups resulting from long-standing deprivation. 
It should be clear that social security systems differ considerably between 
societies. It is therefore almost impossible to analyze social security 
systems without referring to a particular society. The aim of this section is 
to discuss the basic elements of social security systems. 
The theoretical points made in this section are mainly derived from 
Partsch (1983), which is one of the few studies that intends to develop a 
theoretical framework to analyze social security systems in non-industrial-
ized societies. Methods of redistribution underlying social security systems 
will be discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2. will deal with principles and 
forms of social security systems, while Section 4.3. will briefly indicate the 
main determinants of social security systems. 
4.1. Methods of redistribution and social security systems 
The inadequacy of individual precautions against contingencies (see 
Section 3) does not mean that social precautions are automatically there. 
Both the emergence and existence of social precautions, i.e., a social 
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security system, depend on sever-al conditions. We can find such condi-
tions when we look at the theoretical possibilities of realizing the objec-
tives of social security. 
Essentially there are only two possibilities to protect an individual against 
a contingency. Firstly, by trying to avoid a risk occurrence and secondly, 
by eliminating or easing the consequences of a risk. We have already seen 
in Section 3 that the eümination of a risk occurrence is difficult to attain. 
In industrialized countries fast technological and medical progress suc-
ceeded in reducing the occurrence of mostly weather-induced risks and 
medical risks (epidemics, for example). Nevertheless, industrialized 
countries did not succeed in eliminating all kind of contingencies. For 
developing countries, with lower levels of technological and medical 
development, the elimination of risks occurrences is even more difficult 
and is therefore not a likely solution for the protection of an individual. In 
both developed and developing countries, therefore, we depend on the 
elimination or easing of the consequences of a contingency by individual 
and social precautions. As we are concerned here with social precautions 
only, the question is how these social precautions can be realized. 
In Section 2 we argued that risk occurrences often have consequences for 
an individual's Standard of living. These consequences of a contingency for 
someone's Standard of living (i.e., ability to achieve minimum levels of 
certain basic functionings) are mostly negative and also feit as such by the 
person in question. A recuperation of the initial Standard of living 
requires, economically speaking, means (goods, services or money).3 Cru-
3
 It is not stated here that the use of means is always sufficiënt to 
recuperate an individual's Standard of living. Drèze and Sen (1991:9), for 
example, indicate in the case of poverty relief that poverty is often 
understood by policy makers as a problem of income shortage. Promoting 
higher incomes is considered, then, as the solution for poverty. But other 
reasons than shortage of income might cause poverty, for example, 
unequal distribution of income within households, gender position, etc. 
The same argument can be applied on our discussion. The use of means 
like goods, services and money do not always guarantee the recuperation 
of the initial standards of living of individuals, although its necessity 
cannot be denied. 
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cial is here that it concerns an extra need, a need that was not there 
before a formerly uncertain event really happened. Given the universal 
scarcity of income, goods and services on the one hand and unlimited 
consumer needs on the other hand, this extra need can only be satisfied 
by abstaining from the satisfaction of other needs (Partsch 1983:60). 
Resources, originally planned for satisfaction of certain needs, must be 
directed to the fulfilment of certain other needs that were not there 
before. In order to let this process take place a redistribution of available 
means is required. Means have to be redistributed among needs to be 
satisfied and among individuals. 
Partsch (1983:60) distinguishes three modes of redistribution: intertem-
poral, interregional, and interpersonal redistribution. With intertemporal 
redistribution is meant redistribution by using means that were accumu-
lated in the past (reserves) or means that are obtained by taking an 
advance on future means (borrowing). Interregional redistribution takes 
places when a surplus of means (i.e., excess above certain defined mini-
mum level of means available) in one region is transferred to a deficit 
region. With interpersonal redistribution part of available means belong-
ing to a person not affected by a risk is transferred to those who were 
affected. 
These general modes of redistribution can also be used as instruments for 
a social security system to solve its problem (how to fïïlfil an additional 
need for means as result of a contingency). Whether or not social security 
systems can be based on one or more of these modes of redistribution 
depends on the extent to which conditions are fulfilled to let a particular 
mode of redistribution function. Let us have a closer look at these 
conditions, then. 
Intertemporal redistribution 
Intertemporal redistribution requires in the first place that production and 
consumption of means do not take place in the same period. This require-
ment leads to the conclusion that it must be possible to store means in 
order to make intertemporal redistribution possible. If we distinguish 
between goods, services and money we can easiiy see that the possibility 
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of storing means differs according to the kind of means we are talking 
about. 
When looking at developing countries one of the goods most produced 
and consumed is food. However, especially in rural areas, it is extremely 
difficult to store food and related products. Low level of technological 
development and lack of storage facilities hamper the possibility of inter-
temporal redistribution of these goods. In many developing countries 
keeping cattle is a common practice and can be an example of storing 
durable food. However, besides being consumer good, cattle is also often 
used as production input. Therefore, the use of cattle in times of extra 
consumption needs is limited, because otherwise future subsistence could 
be highly endangered. Services, as another form of means, are not suitable 
for intertemporal redistribution simply because the production (delivery) 
of services cannot be separated in time from its consumption. Money, the 
third means, has facilitated intertemporal redistribution. For an individual 
or a household, for instance, the moment of generating an income and 
consuming it can be easily separated by saving or investing in durable 
items. Money is also easy to take an advance on. But in most developing 
countries, especially in the rural areas, financial institutions and markets 
are not well developed, which hampers the possibility of redistributing 
money in time. Much literature can be found on this subject (see, for 
example, Adams et al. 1984, Von Pischke et al. 1983). We will not go into 
detail here. The point made here is that the existence money creates 
more opportunities for intertemporal redistribution to be an instrument 
for social security systems. However, the administrative and organizational 
skills that are required then are very high and most developing countries 
are unable to fulfil these requirements. This makes that intertemporal 
redistribution is less likely to be found as instrument of social security 
systems in developing countries. 
Interregional redistribution 
Interregional redistribution involves the movement of means from a 
region with a surplus of means to a region with a deficit. Two important 
prerequisites for interregional redistribution to take place are a good 
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transport system and a good communication network. The transport 
system is of course necessary to transport surpluses to the deficit areas; 
communication networks are necessary in order to identify quickly surplus 
and deficit areas, and to let the necessary means arrive in time. Drèze 
and Sen (1991), for example, stress the importance of an early warning 
system in case of regional food shortages, which could highly reduce the 
damage caused by such regional shortages. In many developing countries 
a good transport and communication system is absent. It is therefore not 
likely that regional redistribution can be a appropriate method of social 
security systems.4 
Interpersonal redistribution 
One of the features of interpersonal redistribution is that it requires to a 
much lesser extent the conditions, necessary for redistribution in time or 
space. This makes interpersonal redistribution, as method of social 
security systems, more appropriate in developing countries than intertem-
poral and interregional redistribution. One should expect, then, in most 
developing countries social security systems based on interpersonal 
redistribution as the main method for the requisite redistribution of 
means. It is not stated here that interpersonal redistribution is automati-
cally the method if the conditions for intertemporal and interregional 
redistribution are not fulfilled. But, as we will see in this section, in 
developing countries the conditions for interpersonal redistribution to be 
a method of redistribution are easier to accomplish than for intertemporal 
and interregional redistribution. This might lead to the hypothesis that 
technologically and economically less developed societies will have social 
security systems mainly based on the method of interpersonal redistribu-
tion. 
One of the first economie conditions for interpersonal redistribution to be 
a feasible instrument for the distribution of means within social security 
4
 This statement refers to regional redistribution within a country or 
society. At international level regional redistribution is often used as 
method for social security systems, for example in the case of emergency 
help between industrialized and developing countries. 
21 
systems is that the production and the consumption of means are separate 
processes at the individual level (Partsch 1983:63). This implies that some 
kind of division of labour must exist. Although the degree of division of 
labour in developing countries is lower than in the industrialized market 
economies, some division of labour exists, mostly according to sex and 
age. 
Another important economie condition for interpersonal redistribution to 
take place is the ratio producers versus non-producers. Each society 
consists of a number of producers and non-producers (among others, 
mostly children and elderly). The survival of the non-producers depends 
heavily on the number of producers that can produce more means of 
subsistence than necessary for their own consumption. To guarantee each 
member of society an acceptable Standard of living, then, the ratio 
producers to non-producers cannot be too low. Economie development, 
attended with a productivity rise, allows a higher number of non-pro-
ducers and consequently a lower ratio. 
The irnportance of the ratio producers/non-producers can be shown when 
we look at what happens when (as result of a contingency) the number of 
non-producers rises. If the objective is to maintain the Standard of living 
of non-producers the Standard of living of producers will fall (unless the 
labour productivity is increased), because of a higher burden for each 
producer. The argument goes the other way around if the objective is to 
maintain the Standard of living of the producers: the non-producers will 
suffer then. A good example of the irnportance of this ratio is the increas-
ing concern in industrialized countries with the ageing population, causing 
a situation in which a decreasing number of producers have to carry the 
burden for an increasing number of non-producers. It should be clear that 
depending on the level of economie development, a minimum value of the 
ratio producers/non-producers is necessary to guarantee an acceptable 
minimum Standard of living for each member of society. 
The existence of division of labour and a minimum amount of producers 
compared to non-producers are two important economie conditions for 
interpersonal redistribution. However, because interpersonal redistribution 
involves the transfer of means from one individual to another, Partsch 
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(1983:64) states that also sotio-structural, institutional and normative 
conditions have to be fulfUled to make interpersonal redistribution an 
appropriate method for social security systems. This requires a more 
detailed analysis of interpersonal redistribution as method for social 
security systems. 
Within social security systems interpersonal redistribution can be an 
instrument to balance risks and needs within human groups or societies. 
The question can be asked, then, under what conditions this balancing will 
take place, as we cannot assume that in each spontaneously formed 
human group such a balancing will take place. 
Zacher (1979) labels a group that reaches social security by interpersonal 
redistribution as a solidarity group or risk-group. This group can be 
formed when individuals are confronted with the threat of one or more 
common contingenties and the members want to take common precau-
tions against this threat. The extent to which a risk and need balancing in 
a solidarity group takes place depends on four factors, then: the size of 
the group, the composition of the group, the durability of the group, and 
the principle of redistribution within the group. 
The size of the group is important because it determines the burden that 
will fall on each single member when one or more group member(s) 
fall(s) short of particular needs. The more members the group has, the 
lesser will be the burden for each single member when one of them falls 
short. A minimum size for a solidarity or risk group would be difficult to 
estimate, but it can be suggested that the size must exceed those of a 
nuclear family (husband, wife and children) (Partsch 1983:65-6). On the 
other hand the group cannot be too large. Platteau (1991:136)) refers here 
to the incentive problem: "any kind of collective action - including social 
security arrangements - is always under serious threat from incentive 
problems". These problems actually arise when information is costly and 
asymmetrically distributed, and they usually take the form of moral hazard 
and adverse selection (Newbery 1989:278-9; Binswanger and Rosenzweig 
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1986:507; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:165-6).5 These problems can only be 
avoided when elaborate record-keeping is possible and transaction costs 
of providing insurance, including social security (administrative and 
information costs) are relatively low (Platteau 1991:136). We have already 
argued that administrative systems in developing countries are usually not 
well developed and organized. Platteau (1991:137) states that the problem 
of asymmetrical information is one of the reasons why social security 
schemes in developing countries can be found mainly at the level of small 
communities and social groups. The cost of information collection and 
contract enforcement is reduced, then, to manageable levels. Historical 
ties and personalized relationships tend to allow further reductions of 
information costs. Moreover, given the interlinked nature of many transac-
tions and the lack of alternative possibilities (other communities or social 
groups being themselves tightly-knit social entities with entry barriers), the 
cost of free-riding or rule-breaking tends to be so high that even implicit 
or tacit commitments can be considered as more or less self-enforcing. 
For a group to be a solidarity group in which balancing takes place 
between risks and needs, the composition of the group is another condi-
tion. The composition must be such that at all times there are enough 
members who can give sufficiently of their own means to members in 
need. This implies a composition of the group by which not all members 
are affected by the same risk at the same time (so called collective risks). 
To give an example: it does not make much sense for farmers living in an 
ecologically uniform area and carrying out activities which are similar 
from a risk point of view to pool or share their risks. If they are all maize 
5
 In the economie theory of insurance, moral hazard arises 'when an 
agent who obtains insurance has an incentive to take less care to avoid 
the contingencies which give rise to claims'. As for adverse selection, it 
occurs 'when the insurance company cannot distinguish between agents 
who have different probabilities of claims, and hence must offer all the 
same contract', with the result that the contract only appeals to (and ad-
versely selects) those belonging to a comparatively high-risk category 
(Newbery 1989:278). Both problems arise from 'asymmetrie information' 
regarding the relevant personal characteristics of the agent seeking 
insurance. 
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growers, for example, a drought or maize disease will affect them all to 
the same extent. No one is able then to help each other. A fundamental 
theorem of the economie theory of risk and insurance deals with this so 
called covariance of risks. The theorem is that the cost of an additional 
risk depends on its covariance with existing risks: the cost will be bigher 
the stronger the degree of positive variance, whilst negatively correlated 
risks will have the effect of reducing the total cost of risk bearing. 
Consequently, there are potential gains from trade in risk when incomes 
and contingencies are uncorrelated while, if all agents face sirnilar risks, 
risk cannot be reduced much by trading between the participants (Plat-
teau 1991:139; Newbery 1989:270-2; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:165). To 
continue with the example of the farmers: the high covariance of yields 
accounts here for the difficulty of providing insurance against collective 
risks, that is, risks which affect all the participants simultaneously. The 
counterpart is when farmers, carrying out different activities from a risk 
point of view, pool their risks; a contingency would not affect all farmers 
to the same extent and enough farmers will be left to supply means of 
subsistence to help the needy. In sum, when covariate risks exist social 
security by interpersonal redistribution is not possible (or it is possible, 
but no one will enter the scheme). The composition of the group, given a 
particular risk, is therefore important for interpersonal redistribution to 
succeed as method of social security. 
The durability of a solidarity group is another important condition. For all 
members it must be certain that the group will continue to exist when the 
contingencies occur and during the whole period in which consequences 
are feit as result of the contingency. Interpersonal redistribution takes 
place, when it is certain that the size and composition of a group or 
community will exist in future. Especially solidarity groups that are able to 
replace departing members over time are suitable for interpersonal 
redistribution as method for social security. Extended families or clans, for 
example, are perfect solidarity groups from this point of view. 
The former three conditions, size, composition, and durability are necess-
ary but not sufficiënt conditions. If we want a group to be a solidarity or 
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risk group a principle must be present that obliges members to support 
other members when necessary. There must be nonns or values that force 
members to redistribute means from those who have to those who have 
not. The existence of such a "normative insurance" (Partsch 1983:67) is a 
perquisite because it cannot be expected from the individual members 
that they will contribute and contribute sufficiently at times that this is 
needed. Customary rules, moral principles and community norms consti-
tute, therefore, a powerful means of assuring each participant that co-
operation will ensue and the obligations created will be enforced (Plat-
teau 1991:139). When a group lasts long enough it might be argued that 
the necessary redistribution of means will take place, as for the individual 
contributions and receipts will balance in the long run. But such a balance 
can only be expected with certainty when a far reaching equivalence 
between contribution and benefit is secured, like with private insurance 
(Partsch 1983:67).6 The realization of this equivalence principle is in 
developing countries not possible because some important insurance-
technical assumptions are not given (homogeneous and estimable risks; 
application of the law of big numbers). Moreover, the use of the equival-
ence principle is limited when it leads to situations that are in conflict 
with other (often more important) values and norms of a group or society. 
The equivalence principle would, for example, lead to lack of protection 
for those who cannot contribute sufficiently. When the objective is also to 
create a social or needs balance the equivalence principle should be 
replaced or at least be strengthened by another principle, for example, the 
principle of solidarity. 
In this section we argued that the problem of a social security system is 
how to redistribute means from those who have to those who have not. 
6
 With private or individual insurance the insurant pays an insurance 
premium that corresponds with expected values of insurance benefits. If 
the calculated contribution is correct and the group of insured people is 
large enough, the collected contributions must be sufficiënt to balance the 
losses or damages of an insured who suffered from a contingency. Also in 
this case interpersonal redistribution takes place, but the only objective is 
to restore the status quo before the risk occurred (Partsch 1983:67, note 
61). 
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Three methods of redistribution were discussed that can be used as 
instruments for a social security system. The extent to which these instru-
ments can be of use for social security systems depends on the fulfilment 
of certain conditions in order to let these methods of redistribution 
function. A preliminary conclusion can be that intertemporal and 
interregional redistribution as method of social security systems in devel-
oping countries is not likely to be found to a large extent. Tbis lead us to 
the conclusion that, if social security systems in developing countries are 
present, they will most likely use the method of interpersonal redistribu-
tion, because the conditions for this form of redistribution are relatively 
easy to attain in developing countries. 
42. Principles and forms of social security systems 
As said under Heading 4 the term social security system refers to all 
measures and strategies by society that, in their entirety, contribute to the 
objectives of social security. When we want to describe these measures 
and strategies separately, we are talking about the "forms" of a social 
security system (Partsch 1983:70). Often these forms of social security 
follow a certain leitmotif that determines the specific measures and tune 
the measures to each other. Such a leitmotif is often based on a more 
general social value. When we analyze these leitmotifs we are talking 
about the "prmciples" of a social security system (Partsch 1983:70). 
It is clear that principles and forms differ per society, but let us illustrate 
the relationship between principles and forms with two examples. 
The first example comes from the industrialized countries. The dominant 
principle underlying western forms of social security is without doubt the 
"insurance principle". In essence this principle means that an individual 
who is threatened by a contingency pays contributions which will return to 
the individual when the contingency will occur (risk balancing). Crucial 
for the insurance principle is that only those people can profit who also 
contributed in the past. Moreover, when this principle is applied unmod-
ified only those persons can participate that are able to raise the contribu-
tions. This insurance principle reflects to a large extent the fundamentals 
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of the modern prestation and market society. At the same time the forms 
of the social security system are highly determined, when choosing this 
insurance principle. Necessary is the formation of a risk group, regulation 
of the collection of contributions of the insured and the distribution over 
those who were affected by a contingency. This again requires specialized 
organizational skills and expert knowledge. Institutions are build then to 
meet the demand for such organizations. 
Different from the first example is the situation in non-industrialized 
countries, especiaily those that have been isolated from western influences 
for a long time. The main principle underlying forms of social security is 
kinship. The importance and significance of kinship in non-industrialized 
countries have fascinated anthropologists for decades. Many studies reveal 
that economie, but also political and social acting in these societies were 
or are determined by kinship ideology. Important here is that, as far as 
economie, political and social acting within a given kingroup is concerned, 
these actings can be reduced to a principle of amity, which is very similar 
to Sahlin's principle of general reciprocity.7 This principle is reflected in 
the forms of social security existing in named societies. Forms of social 
security, or institutions or processes that can be labelled as such, are often 
based on this principle of general reciprocity. As at the same time the 
kinship ideology determines who is kin member and who is not, kinship 
builds at the same time a solidarity group that is able to provide social 
security for its members, based on the principle of amity or general 
reciprocity. 
In developing countries a high variety of forms and principles of social 
security can be found. 
7
 With general reciprocity Sahlins (1972:185-275) means transactions 
by which a weak relation exists between contribution and benefits, for 
example, gifts to kin. Personal or social relationships between the actors 
dominate the materiel aspects of the transaction. Although each gift 
creates an entitiement on a contra-gift, its quantity, quality and time of 
dehvery is not determined in advance, and depends on the possibilities of 
the receiver and the need of the giver. In extreme cases general reciproc-
ity can lead to a one way move of means, for example, in case of handi-
capped people. 
28 
In literature on social security in developing coimtries attempts have been 
made to classify its different forms. The argument is that because of 
increasing market penetration and the introduction of capitalist relations 
of production new social security forms arise that are different from those 
existing before the colonial period. Studies on social security systems in 
developing countries remarkably show an tendency to classify social 
security forms in developing countries with help of dichotomies. The 
dichotomies "modern" versus "traditional" and "formal" versus "informar 
can often be found (see, for example, Platteau 1991, several contributions 
in Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988, Bossert 1985). However, as Von 
Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988) indicate, some problems are connected 
with the use of these dichotomies modern-traditional and formal-informal. 
With the modern-traditional dichotomy is mostly indicated the difference 
between state organized institutions for social security, which are relative-
ly new in developing countries, and forms of social security which func-
tion(ed) in the traditional or pre-capitalist society. In developing countries 
we find many rules and principles which are of ancient origin and which 
have been maintained through tradition within local communities. But the 
use of the term "traditional" might imply the notion of an "unchanging 
tradition" in those societies. Also traditions "discovered" during the 
colonial period were influenced or even created by economie and admin-
istrative measures of colonial governments. It makes sense to describe as 
"traditional", as von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988:12) suggest, those forms 
of social security which are rationalized by reference to tradition, and to 
distinguish them from historically more recent and innovative legal rules 
and institutions, as for instance the emerging local institutions of self and 
mutual help. But it must be kept in mind that these institutions are not 
necessarily informal, traditional, archaic or customary. They may be 
modern phenomena, the highly rational responses of people united by a 
common interest in overcoming problems of need and risk through a 
cooperative effort. Besides this, large parts of state law can be considered 
to be traditional, too. This is especially the case with those old rules which 
have been handed down through the generations within the community of 
legal scholars, judges and state bureaucrats. Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 
(1988:13) suggest that we might do better to speak, with respect to any 
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society, of old rules and recent innovations, of historical and contempor-
ary legal forms, if we want to give a temporal aspect to our conceptual 
usage. They conclude, that "if we use the conventional pairs of temis to 
identify in a general way state law on the one hand, and traditional law 
on the other, we are certainly embarking on a mistaken voyage filled with 
false comparisons and false contradictions" (Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1988:13). 
The second dichotomy to be found in literature is formal versus informal 
social security forms. As in other spheres of life (such as labour relations 
and credit arrangements) "formal" tends to be equated with western-style, 
state-initiated social security, and "informal" with social security provided 
by famüy, kinship and village groups. By this equation, however, we are 
almost certain to miss the informal elements in the western, and the 
formal elements in the indigenous systems. The actual working of western 
social security often resembles very little a model of formal applications 
of universal rules. Local, indigenous forms of social security, on the other 
hand, can be very formal. In the local village and tribal spheres we are 
dealing with sets of quite well defined legal obligations and rights, on any 
reasonable view of what is "legal". Obviously, we also find informal mutual 
help arrangements which transcend legal obligations. These, however, 
should be opposed to the arrangements of both state and local laws. So 
we can distinguish formal and informal aspects of social security forms in 
different societies, but cannot classify sets of social security arrangements 
(state and indigenous respectively) along the same line (Von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1988:12). 
Previous remarks suggest that a classification according to dualistic lines 
should be avoided. Can we think of an altemative classification? Yes, if 
we can argue why we want such a classification in the first place. One 
argument is that a classification can make an investigation into the 
functioning of social security forms easier. As argued developing countries 
show a variety of social security principles and forms, not in the last place 
caused by the influence of colonial and post-colonial developments. A 
"social security pluralism" (Zacher 1988:26) has developed. By classifying 
these forms according to certain criteria we can group forms and analyze 
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their characteristics, their mutual differences and their dynamics. More-
over, a classification can help us to set bounds to our field of study, when 
we want to analyze a subsection of a given social security system. 
The classification proposed in this study is derived from a common 
classification criterium in our discipline (economics), namely the level of 
analysis. When we would investigate social security forms it will become 
clear that they can be found at all levels of society: community level, in 
churches, at state level, within the family or within kingroups, etc. It is 
mainly for analytical purposes that we want to make a classification 
according to the level at which social security forms play. When is deter-
mined at which level what social security forms can be placed we can 
investigate if these forms at each level follow common principles, use the 
same method of redistribution, are determined by the same factors, etc. 
The hypothesis is that similarities between social security forms will rather 
be found between forms that function at the same level than between 
forms that are classified according to their legal (formal or informal) or 
historica! (modern or traditional) status. 
The first level of analysis we can distinguish is the individual. An individ-
ual can protect him- or herself against contingenties by individual precau-
tions, for example by dissaving, selling durable items, private insurance 
companies, etc. Individual precautions are not social precautions and 
therefore do not fall under the social security scheme. At the individual 
level no social security forms in the proper sense of the word can be 
found. 
When the individual is not able to take precautions him- or herself, the 
first level of support, and our second level of analysis, is the family. Here 
we restrict ourselves in first instance to the nuclear family (husband, wife 
and children). We will call this the household. The household can be con-
sidered as the basic unit of survival. Contingencies will be countered first 
within the household. But when discussing the conditions for solidarity 
groups, we already questioned to what extent the nuclear family, given her 
size, will be able to provide social security to its members and can be 
considered as a valid solidarity group for social security purposes. In this 
study the redistributive principles within the household in times of contin-
gencies are not considered as social security forms. These mechanisms are 
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considered to be part of the household survival strategy. 
The third level of analysis is what we will call the level of small-scale 
social relationships. At this level we can place those social security forms 
that can be found within extended families, clans, communities and 
villages, among friends, neighbours, and church members, etc. 
The fourth level is the so called corporate level, under which we can 
place those social security forms that are neither organized by the state 
nor depend on small scale social relationships. National Provident Funds, 
company funds but also charity organizations might fall under this level. 
The fifth level at which social security forms can be found is the level of 
the state. State initialized and organized social security forms can be 
social assistance schemes, pension schemes and sometimes medical 
schemes. In literature these forms of social security are often headed 
under "formal social security". 
The sixth level is the supra-state level or international level. It can be 
questioned if international social security forms can be found, but emerg-
ency help in case of famines, floods or droughts might be labelled as such. 
Interesting topic of discussion can be if regular development aid also falls 
under international social security. 
4.3. Determinants of social security systems 
What we do not know from previous sections yet is which factors deter-
mine the specific structure of a social security system at a particular place 
and at a particular time. We recall that the issue at stake in social security 
is that a contingency causes a deterioration in the Standard of living of 
individual(s), and that the recuperation would need extra means. Solutions 
were found in the different methods of redistribution that can be used as 
instraments for reaching the objectives of social security. From this point 
of view those factors are important that, firstly, determine the size and 
Although it is stated in this paper that we only consider those forms 
of collective action as social security forms that exceed the household 
level and that contribute to the objectives of social security, we do not 
deny the importance of intra-household relationships when discussing 
social security of individuals (see, for example, Agarwal 1991). 
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composition of disposable means and, secondly, determine the conditions 
for the several methods of redistribution. Partsch (1983:72) distinguishes 
three determinants of social security systems: the level of economie 
development, the social structure, and values and norms of a group or 
society. 
The level of economie development determines in first place the amount 
of goods, services or money available for social security purposes. If there 
are just enough means to give everyone a minimum Standard of living 
problems could arise for those individuals suffering from a contingency. 
The problem in many developing countries is that rnillions of people live 
below a minimum Standard of living. In that case not many means are 
available for social security purposes, and when social security forms exist 
they often take the form of "shared poverty": although no one has enough 
means people will help each other, as they know that in future they also 
will need help one time. In the second place economie development 
causes a increase in the Standard of living. In turn this higher Standard of 
living might lead to a new definition of what should be the minimum 
Standard of living. More means have to be made available then, to bring 
someone back on the initial Standard of living before the contingency 
occurred. In the third place the level of economie development also deter-
mines to a large extent which modes of redistribution can be used as 
instruments for social security systems. We saw that especially intertem-
poral and interregional redistribution require the presence of certain 
economie conditions. The introduction of money, for example, facilitated 
intertemporal redistribution. Moreover, individuals became less dependent 
on goods and services from kin, friends, or other interpersonal transfers as 
money enabled them to contribute to a common fund from which they 
could receive benefits in times of need. The introduction of money 
widened the choice for a particular mode of redistribution and social 
security form. 
Social structure is a ambiguous term and what exactly is understood by 
this term is not clear. Social structure as a general concept comprises a 
multitude of empirically verifiable and relative stable features that 
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characterize a society. Among others, social structure can indicate the 
degree of division of labour, institutions and bureaucracy, social strata and 
class formation, categories of population according to age, education or 
income, etc. With regard to social security systems social structure primar-
ily deals with the Standard of living of its members. Secondly, the social 
structure tells us something about the general social relationships in 
society which, in turn, shape the size and quality of social relationships 
that are important for the (re)distribution processes to take place. In the 
third place several elements from the social structure are important for 
the shape of social security systems, like the age distribution, family 
structure, production and employment structure, settlement patterns, etc. 
Last but not least values and norms that regulate the social acting of 
members of society, are very important. Values symbolize the common 
view of a stratum or a group in society or the common view of a society 
as a whole on what is desirable; values influence and limit the choices 
between possible acts, means and objectives. Values determine the social 
security system to the extent that they influence the principle of social 
security systems that is chosen. As we already argued it is not very likely 
that the social security system of a group or society follows a principle 
that contradicts general and widely acknowledged values. Moreover, 
values are often used to defend a choice for a particular social security 
principle. In westera societies the choice of the insurance principle is 
justified by referring to its correspondence with generally accepted values 
like self-responsibility and "Leistungsgerechtigkeit" (Partsch 1983:74).9 
Values, however, should be upheld irrespective of the situation we are 
talking about. Values have an universal meaning. When we want values to 
be of use for regulating social acting they have to be operationalized. In 
sociology the term "social norms" is used for these operationalizations 
(Partsch 1983:74). Norms are mandatory and relatively constant mies of 
conduct; norms indicate exactly in a particular situation how to handle 
9
 With "Leistungsgerechtigkeit" is meant the general idea prevailing in 
western societies that a person can only benefit if he or she also contrib-
uted in the past. Distribution takes place "according to work or contribu-
tion" and not "according to need". 
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and what acts are prescribed or probibited. If norms are respected in daily 
life they do not only direct social acting but also bring about a certain 
regularity, uniformity and repetition in the outcomes of particular social 
acts. This latter characteristic of norms is important for social security 
systems as the functioning of the system depends on regulation and 
regularity. As said earlier, it cannot be expected that the necessary 
processes of (re)distribution will take place and will take place adequate-
ly, when no norms are present to force members of a solidarity group to 
contribute. 
By identifying the three main determinants of social security systems, it is 
possible theoretically to solve the problem of explaining why social 
security systems differ from each other and why they change. These 
differences and changes can be explained because determinants differ and 
because changes take place in these determinants. The analysis of the 
determinants and their changes would explain to a large extent the 
dynamics of social security systems. The question which factors cause the 
changes of the determinants might lead to the ultimate identification of 
changes in social security systems, but this would require a comprehensive 
study of the dynamics of societies. Although attempts have been made, no 
such theory exists and the analysis of the determinants is all that is 
possible. It should be said here that the determinants are not separate 
entities in a given society and are highly interdependent. A change in one 
of the determinants will cause changes in the other two. Because of this 
interdependency Partsch (1983:76) suggests to combine the changes of 
these determinants in one term when they are used to explain the devel-
opment of social security systems. The term Partsch uses is "social differ-
entiation", a long-lasting process of development whereby small, homo-
geneous social formations develop to larger, heterogeneous and complex 
societies because of increasing division of labour, social stratification and 
other structural changes. In a process of social differentiation not only the 
determinants are changing but also the individual standards of living will 
gradually differentiate. This process has consequences for the social 
security system as this will lead to plural forms of social security. 
For theoretical purposes it might be useful, then, to classify societies 
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according to the degree of social differentiation. Analogue to this classifi-
cation also the social security systems wül differ. Partsch (1983:78) 
distinguishes less differentiated or primitive societies (archaic societies), 
more differentiated or complex societies (feudal societies) and highly 
differentiated or modern industrial societies. Of course all kind of inter-
mediate forms are possible. 
In this place it is important to know where to place the developing 
countries. Partsch (1983:78) concludes on the one hand that the so-called 
developing countries cannot be considered as modern industrial societies 
and on the other hand did not arose because of a autonomous process of 
social differentiation but from contacts with other civilizations. 
Evidently, developing countries also have their own dynamics. One 
difference with industrialized countries, however, is that the own internal 
dynamic of pre-capitalist societies was highly disturbed and sometimes 
destroyed by the intrusion of capitalist elements and forces. The pre-
capitalist social formations changed structurally as a result of western 
expansion in these societies. 
Six fundamental processes of change have been taking place in the pre-
capitalist societies: the introduction of a money economy, the introduction 
of private ownership of land and of commercial monocultures, migrations 
of workers and the flight from the land, urbanization, industrialization, 
and national integration. 
The introduction of money. or the intensification of its use, was an 
important change. The development of a money economy was bound up 
with the conversion of traditional taxes from kind into money, with the 
growth of trade and the replacement of barter by money exchange, and 
lastly with the organization and expansion of wage-earning labour in 
accordance with the requirements of the government and the colonial 
economy. 
The development of capitalism also gave rise to the individual appropri-
ation of land. The indigenous population was often expropriated and the 
land was divided amongst a privileged group of people. In Latin America 
this process started earlier than in Africa or Asia. 
The development of new economie activities (like mining and other 
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industries) and new organization forms of agriculture (like plantations) 
increased the need for wage-labourers, entailing significant migratory 
flows of workers. These migrations can be of a temporary or of a more 
permanent character. The latter induces a one-way traffic from the 
countryside to the towns. 
Urbanization has become a very important phenomenon in recent years. 
Towns and cities have been created to fulfil functions of an administra-
tive, miHtary, commercial or other nature. 
Industrialization has taken a specific form bound up with Western devel-
opment. It is usually confined to industries exploiting natural resources 
and providing raw materials for export, or light manufacturing industries 
exporting mainly to western countries. 
Finally, there is the emergence of nationhood, which has its roots in 
European expansion. But this national integration process if far from 
complete: there are still marked ethnic and regional differences in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. 
The above six structural processes have transformed pre-capitalist 
societies with regard to their activities (industries and plantations, new 
agricultural technologies), their way of life (urbanization, population 
movements, money economy), their social stracture (development of 
private ownership, appearance of new production relations) and, lastly, 
their socio-political organization (process of colonization foliowed by 
national integration), social psychology and culture (Malassis 1975:60-1). 
The result of these structural changes is what we tend to call developing 
countries. Pre-capitalist societies have been fundamentally transformed 
and depending on the country or region concerned these pre-capitalist 
societies may largely have been destroyed or a dualistic structure has 
emerged where pre-capitalist and capitalist elements exist alongside each 
other. 
It will be clear to the reader that these structural changes in the economie 
and social structure, and in the norms and values largely influence social 
security forms in developing countries. The questions how and to what 
extent social security forms are influenced by these structural changes are 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it must be clear that insight in these 
structural processes is necessary in order to understand the development 
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of and changes in social security ferms in developing countries. 
5. SUMMARY 
In this paper we discussed some basic issues with regard to social security 
and social security systems. In the first section we defined social security 
in such a way that also social security in developing countries can be 
analyzed. In the second section we justified our choice for a wider defini-
tion by explaining the universal necessity of social security. The actual 
efforts by a given society to reach the objectives of social security have 
been defined in the third section as a social security system. We discussed 
three modes of redistribution that can be used as method underlying 
social security systems. We discussed also the conditions under which 
these modes of redistribution can operate. Then we defined briefly the 
terms "principles" and "forms" of social security systems, discussed two 
classification methods for social security forms, and introduced a third 
classification. In the last subsection the main determinants of social 
security systems were analyzed and six major socio-economic develop-
ments were indicated that take place in developing countries. 
It is thought that the concepts and ideas presented in this paper may 
contribute to the construction of an analytical framework of social security 
which is less biased to western social security systems and, consequently, 
enables the study of social security in developing countries to be done in a 
wider perspective than many studies have done until sofar. 
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